Somalia and the Gulf Crisis Soomaaliya iyo Dhibaatada Khaliijka

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Preventing War. Shaping Peace.
Somalia and the Gulf Crisis
Africa Report N°260 | 5 June 2018
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. i
I. Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 1
II. Farmajo’s Presidency and the Gulf Crisis ……………………………………………………………… 3
III. A New Twist to Old Struggles in Mogadishu ………………………………………………………….. 8
IV. Fracturing the Security Sector? ……………………………………………………………………………. 11
V. Mogadishu-Federal State Government Friction …………………………………………………….. 14
VI. A Dangerous Spat with Somaliland ………………………………………………………………………. 17
VII. Taking a Step Back …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 19
VIII. Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 22
APPENDICES
A. Map of the Gulf Region ………………………………………………………………………………………. 23
B. About the International Crisis Group …………………………………………………………………… 24
C. Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on Africa since 2015 ………………………………………… 25
D. Crisis Group Board of Trustees ……………………………………………………………………………. 27
Principal Findings
What’s new? The rivalries underpinning the June 2017 Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) crisis – particularly between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on
the one hand and Qatar and, by extension, Turkey on the other – have spilled
into the Horn of Africa, notably fanning instability in Somalia. Mogadishu-Abu
Dhabi tensions have risen sharply.
Why did it happen? The Somali government of President “Farmajo” says it
remains neutral in the GCC rivalry, but the UAE perceives it as too close to Qatar.
Abu Dhabi appears to have upped support to Somalia’s regions, or federal
states. Farmajo, in turn, has deepened ties with Doha and Ankara and repressed
rivals.
Why does it matter? Certainly not all of Somalia’s problems can be pinned
on the GCC crisis. But competition among the Gulf powers and Turkey has
magnified intra-Somali disputes. As Mogadishu-Abu Dhabi relations unravel,
those disputes – which pit the Farmajo government against rival factions in
Mogadishu and against federal states and Somaliland – could escalate.
What should be done? The Somali government should remain neutral in
the intra-GCC spat and reconcile with Somali rivals. Qatar and Turkey could
encourage such reconciliation. The UAE should coordinate with Mogadishu
regarding all its aid and investment in Somalia. Abu Dhabi-Mogadishu talks are
a priority – Saudi or European Union officials could mediate.
International Crisis Group
Africa Report N°260 5 June 2018
Executive Summary
The bitter rivalries underpinning the crisis among members of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) have added a dangerous new twist to Somalia’s instability. Competition
between the United Arab Emirates (UAE), on the one hand, and Qatar and, by
extension, Turkey on the other has aggravated longstanding intra-Somali disputes:
between factions in the capital; between Mogadishu and the regions; and between it
and the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. Abu Dhabi’s relations with the government
of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmajo” have tanked. Farmajo’s
government accuses the Emiratis of funding its rivals and stoking opposition, particularly
in Somalia’s federal states. Emirati officials deny meddling and accuse Farmajo
of falling under Doha’s and Ankara’s sway. All sides need to take a step back.
Farmajo’s government should abide by strict neutrality in the intra-GCC spat and
seek to reconcile with its Somali rivals. The UAE should pledge to coordinate its aid
and commercial interests with Mogadishu. Talks between the Somali and UAE governments
are a priority.
After the June 2017 Gulf crisis, which saw Saudi Arabia, the UAE and a number
of allies sever diplomatic relations with and impose an economic blockade on Qatar,
President Farmajo, who had assumed office only months earlier, faced intense Saudi
and Emirati pressure – reportedly pushing him to cut ties with Doha. Farmajo
insisted he preferred not to pick sides. But for the UAE, reports that the president
had received Qatari funds ahead of his election and his appointment of officials
known to be close allies of Doha belied his claims of neutrality. Abu Dhabi feared
that increased Qatari and Turkish backing for the Somali government could embolden
political Islamists – whose influence it regards as a threat but to whom Doha and
Ankara tend to be more sympathetic – and that, amid intense jockeying for influence
around the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, it was fast losing ground to its main geopolitical
rivals.
In response, the UAE appears to have stepped up support for other Somali factions
and Somalia’s federal states. The Farmajo government in turn has displayed an
increasingly authoritarian bent, using rivals’ alleged ties to the UAE to justify crackdowns
against them. Long adept at manipulating foreign involvement, politicians
across the Somali spectrum have exploited the escalating rivalry for their own ends.
Mounting tension between the UAE and what it perceives as a Qatar- and Turkeybacked
government in Mogadishu intersects with a number of Somali fault lines.
First, it has amplified disputes between the government and rival factions in the capital,
complicating a crisis in the Somali parliament that threatened to turn violent in
late 2017. In early 2018, the government raided the homes and offices of two
prominent critics, accusing them of receiving Emirati funds. Deteriorating relations
between the Somali government and the UAE also may heighten risks of factionalism
within the Somali security forces; Somali officials accuse Emirati-backed units
of ignoring orders (Abu Dhabi says all troops were under the Somali Ministry of
Defence’s command).
Still more perilous is the deterioration in Farmajo’s relations with Somalia’s federal
states. As his government refused to distance itself from Qatar, federal states,
some of which depend on Emirati investment and chafed at Mogadishu charting a
course on the Gulf crisis they perceived as contrary to their interests, took a public
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Crisis Group Africa Report N°260, 5 June 2018 Page ii
stand against his position. Circumventing the capital, some appear to have accelerated
negotiations with DP World – an Emirati conglomerate the activity of which is widely
perceived as serving Abu Dhabi’s strategic goals – over deals that would see DP
World develop and manage their ports. Recent months have seen increasingly heated
recriminations between senior government officials and federal state leaders, some
of whom have made provocatively timed trips to Abu Dhabi.
A bitter standoff between Mogadishu and the breakaway region of Somaliland
could prove as dangerous. In March, Hargeisa’s finalisation of its own contract with
DP World, according to which the conglomerate would develop Somaliland’s Berbera
port, prompted a furious reaction from Mogadishu. Farmajo’s government protested
to the Arab League that the deal violated its sovereignty. The Somali parliament
enacted legislation banning DP World from operating in Somalia, thus targeting not
only the Berbera contract, but also potential deals between the company and federal
states. Somaliland’s leader, Muse Bihi Abdi, referred to Mogadishu’s attempt to
block the agreement as a declaration of war.
In April 2018, Mogadishu-Abu Dhabi relations took their worst turn yet, when
Somali officials confiscated millions of dollars from an Emirati plane in Mogadishu,
citing the money as evidence of Abu Dhabi’s meddling. According to Emirati officials,
the funds were destined for Somali security forces whose salaries it has long
been paying. Those officials point to years of Emirati subventions to Somali forces
fighting pirates and Al-Shabaab – support welcomed by successive Somali governments.
Frustrated at the seizure, Abu Dhabi halted aid projects, pulled all personnel
from and abandoned the Mogadishu base at which it was training Somali security
forces. As relations between the Farmajo government and Abu Dhabi unravel, any
one of the intra-Somali disputes – in Mogadishu; between the Farmajo government
and the regions; or between it and Somaliland – could escalate.
All sides need to reverse course before that happens. The Somali government
should ensure it remains neutral in the intra-GCC spat and adopt a more conciliatory
approach to rivals, including by rekindling talks with the federal states and rescheduling
a meeting previously planned between Farmajo and Muse Bihi. Gulf powers
should not allow the rivalry that has split the GCC to upend weaker states. Abu Dhabi
should be ready to enter talks with Farmajo’s government and coordinate its aid and
investment across the country. Qatar and particularly Turkey, whose investment in
Somalia gives it considerable clout, might nudge Mogadishu toward compromise
with its rivals in the capital, the federal regions and Somaliland. Saudi or European
Union officials, who appear to enjoy the trust of both Mogadishu and Abu Dhabi,
could mediate between the two.
Clearly, Somalia’s troubles today cannot all be laid at the Gulf’s door. The optimism
generated by Farmajo’s election win in early 2017 was always likely to run aground
on the country’s thorny clan politics and a resilient Al-Shabaab insurgency. But Gulf
rivalries have made things worse. The zero-sum politics that the Somali government
and foreign powers appear to be pursuing are unlikely to end well. Somalia will
always be too factious for any one axis to dominate. The Gulf powers – and even
more so the Farmajo government and its Somali rivals – all stand to lose from the
instability their competition provokes. The likely winner is Al-Shabaab.
Nairobi/Brussels, 5 June 2018
International Crisis Group
Africa Report N°260 5 June 2018
Somalia and the Gulf Crisis
I. Introduction
Many Somalis greeted the February 2017 electoral win of Mohamed Abdullahi
Mohamed “Farmajo” with euphoria. Farmajo’s cross-clan support and a vote perceived
at the time as reasonably credible left many optimistic that he could turn the
page on decades of instability.1 Fifteen months later, however, Farmajo’s government
is embroiled in a number of debilitating crises. Factionalism in Mogadishu is
rampant, security in the capital is deteriorating, the president’s dealings with Somalia’s
federal states souring, and animosity between Mogadishu and the breakaway Republic
of Somaliland fiercer than at any time in the past decade.
The president’s difficulties stem, in large part, from challenges inherent to ruling
Somalia, surmounting its factious clan politics and containing a resilient Al-Shabaab
insurgency.2 Intense struggles over power and resources have long been endemic to
both the capital and regions; the 2012 Somali provisional constitution, which should
have helped resolve such disputes, instead does little to decide how authority and
assets should be allocated among institutions and between Mogadishu and Somalia’s
federal states. In that light, today’s instability is nothing new. But what lends it particular
potency is the fact that it is amplified by the wider geopolitical confrontation
that, since the June 2017 Gulf crisis, has pitted Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) against Qatar and, by extension, Turkey.
The four powers’ involvement in Somalia predates this crisis. For years, Gulf and
Turkish assistance, including direct budgetary support, humanitarian aid, infrastructure
development, and training and funding for Somali security forces, has been
critical for Somalis and welcomed by successive Somali governments. Their engagement
has always involved some jockeying for influence in a country of enormous
strategic value, given its proximity to the Gulf, centrality to Red Sea security and
string of ports with vantages on key shipping routes.3 But any competition was largely
kept in check.
Since the June 2017 crisis, however, that competition has spilled over. Farmajo’s
government accuses the Emiratis of agitating against it. Abu Dhabi rejects that
charge and believes it is ostracised due to the new government’s proximity to Doha
and Ankara. Friction between Mogadishu and Abu Dhabi, having simmered since
the crisis, boiled over on 8 April 2018, when the Somali government confiscated
$9.6 million in cash at Mogadishu airport from a UAE plane. Shortly thereafter, the
1 Crisis Group Commentary, “The Regional Risks to Somalia’s Moment of Hope”, 22 February 2017.
The vote was indirect, with clan representatives casting ballots for the president.
2 For background, see Crisis Group Report N°170, Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life
Support, 21 February 2012. On Al-Shabaab, see Crisis Group Report N°99, Somalia: Al-Shabaab –
It Will Be a Long War, 26 June 2014.
3 Tension has been particularly acute since the 2011 Arab uprisings, which in Egypt, Tunisia and
Libya saw Qatar and Turkey mostly back mainline Islamists and the UAE, and often Saudi Arabia
support their opponents.
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Crisis Group Africa Report N°260, 5 June 2018 Page 2
UAE suspended military cooperation with Mogadishu, extracted Emirati trainers
and halted aid operations.4 President Farmajo’s May 2018 visit to Doha only five
weeks later, apparently cementing his ties to Qatar, added fuel to the fire. The media
has amplified tensions further, as both UAE- and Qatar-allied outlets have carried
partisan and inflammatory coverage.
This report examines how rivalries among Gulf powers and Turkey and the deterioration
of Abu Dhabi-Mogadishu relations have deepened Somali instability, notably
by aggravating disputes between Farmajo’s government and opposing factions in
Mogadishu; between the government and Somalia’s federal states; and between
Mogadishu and the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. It draws upon interviews
in Somalia, including with senior Somali officials; as well as in Abu Dhabi, Doha,
Ankara, Addis Ababa, Nairobi, New York and Washington.
4 Accounts differ as to whether the UAE decided itself or was asked by the Somali government to
withdraw its mission. Emirati officials say it withdrew from aid projects due to security concerns for
UAE personnel and local staff, who have received threats. Crisis Group interviews, Mogadishu, Abu
Dhabi, Doha, April 2018.
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II. Farmajo’s Presidency and the Gulf Crisis
In the Gulf crisis’s aftermath, President Farmajo’s declaration that he would remain
neutral was met with scepticism in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, who perceived his government
as wedded to Qatar and Turkey. In response, Abu Dhabi appears to have
doubled down on its relations with other Somali factions and Somalia’s federal
states, prompting anger from senior Somali officials and disquiet among Western
and African diplomats. The government’s use of its rivals’ alleged Emirati backing to
justify crackdowns and adoption of anti-Emirati rhetoric to play to its nationalist
base has not helped. Farmajo’s reluctance to cut ties with Qatar and Turkey makes
sense, particularly given the scale of Turkish aid and investment, though his increasing
reliance on both countries has further soured relations with the UAE.
In June 2017, as the Gulf spat escalated and Saudi Arabia, the UAE and their allies
broke off relations with and imposed an embargo on Qatar, the Gulf powers lobbied
governments worldwide, including in Africa, to pick sides. Several African leaders
expelled Qatari diplomats, though a number quietly restored diplomatic ties shortly
afterward.5 Farmajo’s government faced particularly acute pressure, with Riyadh
allegedly offering it additional financial backing in return for it severing ties to Qatar.
6 Instead, Farmajo insisted he was set on keeping Somalia out of the fray.7
Beneath the president’s claims of neutrality, however, lies a more complicated
reality. Before his election, Farmajo ran what seemed to be a bare-bones campaign
for the presidency. His outreach appeared – and likely was – less well-financed than
that of other contenders, who were widely perceived to have received significant outside
funding.8 After the vote, however, unconfirmed reports surfaced that Farmajo’s
campaign had received a last-minute boost from Qatar.9 The president’s early cabinet
appointments added to speculation about his close ties to Doha.10 His refusal to
5 See, for example, “A bitter rivalry between Arab states is spilling into Africa”, The Economist, 23
January 2018.
6 While many accounts of Saudi attempts to woo Farmajo come from Qatari-funded or allied media –
and thus should be treated with caution – a number of Somali and other African officials, as well as
senior European Union diplomats, report significant pressure on the government, including the
offer of additional financial backing, to cut ties with Qatar. Crisis Group interviews, Mogadishu and
other African capitals, September 2017-May 2018. According to one Qatari diplomat, a Saudi delegation
visited Mogadishu to encourage the severing of ties with Doha. Crisis Group phone interview,
April 2018. Also see “Somalia turns down $80m to cut ties with Qatar”, Bartamaha, 12 June 2017.
7 See, for example, “Somalia declares neutral stand in Gulf crisis”, Goobjoog News, 7 June 2017.
8 “Fueled by bribes, Somalia’s election seen as milestone of corruption”, New York Times, 7 February
2017. Foreign political contributions were not regulated but appear to have played a significant role.
Some candidates made official and unofficial visits overseas, reportedly to seek foreign political
support and/or receive funds. “Somalia 2016-2017 Limited Election Process: EU Election Expert
Mission Final Report”, Altair Consortium, February 2017.
9 Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Mogadishu, 2017-2018. Qatar denies
funding individuals, saying all its support goes to the government. Crisis Group phone interview,
Qatari diplomat, April 2018.
10 Farmajo’s campaign manager and subsequent chief of staff, for example, is a former Al Jazeera
correspondent believed to be close to Doha. A UAE official said: “Our understanding of the situation
is that someone who used to be a correspondent for Al Jazeera is now running Villa Somalia”.
Crisis Group interview, Abu Dhabi, May 2018.
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Crisis Group Africa Report N°260, 5 June 2018 Page 4
publicly pick sides in the Gulf spat was thus viewed in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi not as
neutrality, but as, in effect, siding with their rivals.11
His relations with the Saudi-led bloc deteriorated sharply, triggering a temporary
suspension by Riyadh of direct budgetary support of some $30 million per year.12
The Saudis backtracked shortly thereafter, in part, reportedly, worried by anger on
the Somali street – and elsewhere in Africa – that they were using financial muscle
to extract concessions from weaker states.13 Riyadh resumed budgetary support in
October 2017. It may still resent the influence wielded by individuals in Farmajo’s
cabinet it perceives as pro-Qatar or Turkey, but its channels of communication to the
government remain open.
Abu Dhabi’s relations with Mogadishu, on the other hand, have gone from bad to
worse. The UAE has deeper commercial and military ties to Somalia than Saudi
Arabia, part of what Emirati officials describe as a region-wide policy to promote
freedom of maritime navigation and combat Islamist extremism.14 Specifically, the
UAE had trained and supported Somali units since at least 2014, first to combat
piracy, and later for operations against Al-Shabaab.15 According to one senior UAE
official:
If there was no Al-Shabaab in Somalia, we wouldn’t have a footprint. We have
supported the government in Mogadishu to claim back Somali territory. This is
linked to our work in Afghanistan. One of the main reasons we are interested is
because we believe there is a connectivity in this fight – these are the same
groups, being affected by the same narrative. This was the reason for our initial
presence in Somalia and it remains our main goal.16
From the Emiratis’ perspective, Qatar aimed to use its influence in Somali politics,
which has expanded over the last few years, to obstruct their own.17 In Somalia as
11 According to one Gulf official: “Somalia is a conflict point between the UAE and Qatar. Qatar
found a strong ally for their agenda, which is Turkey. They managed to pry away the president of
Somalia [to their control]”. Crisis Group interview, April 2018.
12 Crisis Group Commentary, “A Dangerous Gulf in the Horn: How the Inter-Arab Crisis is Fuelling
Regional Tensions”, 3 August 2017. The Saudis and other “non-reporting development partners”
(among them Turkey, the UAE, Qatar and China) do not always disclose detailed aid figures, but a
recent survey of aid flows shows Saudi Arabia contributed $20 million in 2016 and $30 million in
2017., “Aid Flows in Somalia: Analysis of Aid Flow Data”, Ministry of Planning, Investment and
Economic Development, Federal Republic of Somalia, March 2008 (www.somaliaaidflows.so).
Though Riyadh temporarily cut budgetary aid, its humanitarian support remained largely unaffected;
Saudi Arabia’s King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre reports a total of $12.5 million
in humanitarian aid to Somalia in 2017. See https://data.ksrelief.org/EN/BeneficiaryStatistics.aspx.
13 Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, Somali business leaders, activists and intellectuals, Mogadishu,
Nairobi, February-April 2018. Abu Dhabi also is concerned about its deteriorating image in
Somalia and that Qatar gains by projecting itself as benevolent. Crisis Group interview, Western
diplomat, Abu Dhabi, April 2018.
14 Crisis Group interview, senior UAE official, Abu Dhabi, March 2018.
15 Estimates of the training program’s size vary significantly. One UAE official suggested that as
many as 10,000 Somalis had been trained and were still receiving salaries from the UAE. Crisis
Group interview, Abu Dhabi, May 2018.
16 Crisis Group interview, senior UAE official, Abu Dhabi, March 2018.
17 Crisis Group interviews, UAE official, Abu Dhabi, May 2018; Gulf official, April 2018.
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Crisis Group Africa Report N°260, 5 June 2018 Page 5
elsewhere, Abu Dhabi voices concern about Doha’s and Ankara’s support for political
Islam, particularly movements linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, a force that
Emirati leaders argue is akin ideologically – and a gateway – to more violent and
intolerant forms of Islamism. Over recent years, the UAE has accused Qatar of promoting
Somali politicians sympathetic to Islamists or at times even to Al-Shabaab
itself.18
Abu Dhabi argues that despite its concerns about Farmajo and his staff, it was
willing to work with the new president, but that Qatar was intent on forcing it out.19
As the Emiratis perceived themselves losing ground, they appear to have reinforced
relationships with other Somali leaders, particularly in Somalia’s federal states.20
The Somali government, on the other hand, denounces Emirati interference.
According to Prime Minister Hassan Ali Kheyre:
We cannot compromise on issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity. When
we say we are neutral, we mean we are neutral. We cannot accept to be questioned
on this. No one questions Kenya’s or Ethiopia’s neutrality. Why should
Somalia be punished for saying it wants to be independent?21
Many Western and African officials agree.22 According to a former Western ambassador
to Somalia:
Farmajo’s position of neutrality in the Gulf crisis shocked and angered the Saudis
and Emiratis. He reasoned – correctly in my view – that Somalia had important
relations with all parties and no interest in their dispute. Asserting Somalia’s
sovereignty was in Somalia’s interest. Besides, Turkey is a huge investor in Somalia
and Qatar helps in other ways. Roughly four years earlier, when the Saudis
demanded that Somalia break ties with Iran and expel its diplomats and citizens,
it did so immediately. This defiance from a formerly compliant and weak African
state was unwelcome.23
Certainly, President Farmajo had good cause to remain neutral. That said, his government’s
reaction to what senior officials perceive as Emirati pressure has not
helped. It has adopted increasingly repressive tactics (detailed in subsequent sections)
against rivals, often using their alleged ties to Abu Dhabi as pretext.
Farmajo’s rhetoric against the UAE also appears in part as an attempt to reconnect
with his nationalist base. During his campaign, Farmajo pledged repeatedly to
defend Somalia’s sovereignty against foreign powers, particularly Ethiopia.24 In office,
18 Crisis Group interview, Gulf official, April 2018. A UAE official said, “it is the influence of Qatar
financially, Turkey militarily, and the Muslim Brotherhood ideologically – this is the threat”. Crisis
Group interview, Abu Dhabi, May 2018.
19 Crisis Group interviews, UAE official, Abu Dhabi, May 2018; Gulf official, April 2018.
20 One Gulf official said, “in Somalia the [elected] government comes and goes every four years. The
UAE doesn’t support individuals, because they come and go. We try to build relationships with the
institutions; this is our approach so that we have a stable relationship”. Crisis Group interview,
April 2018.
21 Crisis Group interview, Prime Minister Hassan Ali Kheyre, 24 April 2018.
22 Crisis Group interviews, Mogadishu, Nairobi, January-April 2018.
23 Crisis Group interview, May 2018.
24 Crisis Group Commentary, “Somalia’s Moment of Hope”, op. cit.
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however, he moved quickly to reassure Addis Ababa – sensibly, given the Ethiopian
contingent fighting Al-Shabaab and the importance of maintaining relations with
Somalia’s powerful neighbour.25 But for many supporters, Farmajo’s rapprochement
went too far when he handed over a prominent Ethiopian-Somali rebel commander,
Abdikarim Muse “Qalbi Dagah” to Ethiopia, and declared Abdikarim’s Ogaden
National Liberation Front a terrorist group – a line no previous Somali leader had
dared cross. Since then, Farmajo appears to have sought to offset that concession to
Addis Ababa with a harder line against Abu Dhabi.
The government’s nationalist stand against the UAE also strengthens the perception,
which it has struggled to shake, that it is overly attached to Doha and, to a lesser
extent, Ankara. Beyond his appointment of officials perceived as tied to those two
powers, the president has accepted additional Qatari and Turkish aid. In November
2017, his government signed a deal with Qatar under which Doha will provide $200
million for the construction of two major highways, the rehabilitation of several federal
government buildings and other smaller development projects in Mogadishu
and the Shabelle river valley.26
For their part, Qatari officials argue that Doha’s deepening ties with Mogadishu
are a natural progression of its past humanitarian support and deny its involvement
has an ideological bent.27 According to one foreign ministry official: “Our goal was
never to have a rivalry with the UAE in Somalia. Our engagement is prior to that. It’s
about creating stability and countering extremism in Somalia, through genuine
humanitarian and developmental projects that we are implementing either bilaterally
or through the UN”.28 Doha aims, according to Qatari officials, to carve out a longterm
role as a donor, investing in health, education and exploration of Somalia’s
natural resources, including oil and gas.29
As for Turkey, it is now one of Somalia’s major donors and investors.30 Turkey’s
initial provision of humanitarian aid, particularly during the 2011 famine, has morphed
into commercial interests, direct budgetary support to the government, training
of Somali security forces and thus considerable influence in a country that offers
Ankara an important market for Turkish goods and services as well as strategic
depth.31 Turkish officials echo their Emirati counterparts in emphasising that Ankara’s
25 More than 4,000 Ethiopian troops are currently fighting in Somalia, many with the African Union
mission, AMISOM. See http://amisom-au.org/2016/01/amisom-ethiopian-national-defense-forcescontingent-
deploys-in-kismayo/. For Farmajo’s initial outreach to Ethiopia, see Crisis Group Commentary,
“Somalia’s Moment of Hope”, op. cit.
26 According to Qatari officials, Doha had previously offered budgetary support to Somalia. Crisis
Group interviews, Qatar Development Fund official, Doha, April 2018; Qatari official, phone, April
2018. Also see “Qatar supports Somalia with projects worth $200 million”, Qatar Tribune, 29
November 2017.
27 Qatari officials say that Doha sees Somalia as a strategic gateway into Africa, along the Red Sea
and endowed with undeveloped oil and gas reserves. Crisis Group interviews, Qatari foreign ministry
officials, Doha, April 2018; Qatari official, phone, April 2018.
28 Crisis Group interview, Doha, April 2018.
29 Crisis Group interview, Qatari foreign ministry official, Doha, April 2018.
30 For background, see Crisis Group Briefing N°92, Assessing Turkey’s Role in Somalia, 8 October 2012.
31 Ibid. Crisis Group interviews, Ankara, May 2018. According to one Turkish academic: “There
might be a handful of AKP [Justice and Development Party] people interested in Somalia for ideological
reasons, to foster like-minded Muslim brothers (those in the Western media or the Gulf who
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Crisis Group Africa Report N°260, 5 June 2018 Page 7
support is motivated largely by security, though they place greater weight on
strengthening the central state:
Our priority is security, in other words increasing the ability of the central government
to provide security. Without security, you cannot have development and
people will distrust the central government. The 14 October 2017 Mogadishu
bombing and the smaller suicide bombings since show that Mogadishu needs all
the support it can get.32
Like Qatar, Turkey rejects that its support enables Al-Shabaab. According to one
Turkish official: “That is ridiculous. Our priority is strengthening the national army.
How can this be in line with supporting terrorists?”33 Ankara argues that the Muslim
Brotherhood – in Somalia as elsewhere – is a political reality, a movement that has
never taken up arms itself and an antidote against harder-line groups like Al-
Shabaab.34 Turkish officials emphasise the extent and history of their engagement in
Somalia, against which they view both Emirati and Qatar involvement as superficial.
They tend to distance Ankara’s role from that of Doha.35
In addition to managing Mogadishu port since 2014 and opening, in 2016, the
largest Turkish embassy in the world in the Somali capital, Turkey has expanded its
security assistance. According to Turkish officials, Ankara’s direct budgetary support
to the Somali government also has increased – from $2 million per month a year ago
to $2.5 million today.36 While Turkish influence and investment in Somalia has been
significant for years, these increases reinforce the sense in Abu Dhabi that Mogadishu
is turning from the UAE to Turkey.37
Overall, while the government’s crackdowns against Somali rivals are counterproductive,
its apparent tilt toward Qatar and Turkey is understandable, given the
importance of their investment and aid, Farmajo’s deteriorating relations with Abu
Dhabi and the latter’s apparent backing of his rivals. But as those ties deepen, so,
too, does Emirati disquiet.38
present Turkey as supporting Islamists in Somalia just use this rhetoric to badmouth Turkey).
[Turkish leaders] might tell you Turkey is there for humanitarian reasons. But at the core of Turkey’s
involvement are geostrategic power dynamics”. Crisis Group interview, Istanbul, May 2018.
32 Crisis Group interview, senior Turkish foreign ministry official, May 2018.
33 Ibid.
34 Crisis Group interview, Turkish former diplomat and Turkish officials, Ankara, May 2018. Also
see footnote 31.
35 Ibid. According to the former Turkish diplomat: “Turkey’s position in Somalia is separate from
that of Qatar and definitely above and beyond any UAE-Qatar confrontation. We do not coordinate
our position with Qatar. Compared to Turkey, the UAE’s and Qatar’s involvement is superficial”.
36 Crisis Group interviews, Ankara, May 2018; Qatar Development Fund official, Doha, April 2018.
37 Crisis Group interview, UAE official, Abu Dhabi, May 2018. A common refrain from Farmajo’s
supporters is that Turkish investment can help Somalia weather friction with the UAE. One official
said, “I agree vital economic links are at stake in relation to the Somali-Emirati spat and Dubai
remains a major hub, especially for the Somali informal hawala money transfer system, telecom
companies and shipping. But this is changing. We are diversifying and will not always depend on
one strategic relationship”. Crisis Group interviews, Mogadishu, January-April 2018.
38 Crisis Group interviews, Western diplomats, Abu Dhabi, April 2018.
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III. A New Twist to Old Struggles in Mogadishu
Gulf rivalries are intertwined with competition among factions in Mogadishu. Alleged
Emirati funding of factions opposed to the federal government and, in turn, Farmajo’s
crackdown on rivals, accusing them of receiving millions of Emirati dollars to
agitate against him, have added new complexity to struggles in the capital, as a series
of recent disputes illustrates.39
The first split the Somali parliament into two factions, pitting Prime Minister
Kheyre and a pro-government faction against opponents led by the lower house
speaker, Mohamed Osman Jawari. Reportedly triggered by Kheyre’s frustration at
Jawari’s repeated obstruction of government-sponsored bills, in late 2017 the dispute
escalated into a full-blown crisis, with the government accusing its rivals of orchestrating
an Emirati-funded parliamentary rebellion aimed at forcing out Farmajo and
Kheyre.40 In March 2018, it threatened to turn violent when the government replaced
the parliamentary police with army units, which deployed outside the parliament
building and at checkpoints across the capital. In response, Jawari issued a press
release calling on parliamentarians and the Somali people to protect the legislature.41
Some parliamentarians reportedly summoned clan militias to defend them.42 Armed
clashes were averted only when the African Union mission, AMISOM, brokered a
meeting between the president and speaker.43
Many in Mogadishu believe Gulf funding aggravated the dispute. That said, the
UAE-Qatar rivalry does not map precisely onto the opposing sides, as illustrated by
the subtle game Jawari himself has played. Though often portrayed as Emiratibacked,
in reality he often played pro-Qatar and pro-UAE factions in the lower house
off against each other in order to maintain influence.
In March 2018, for example, he masterminded a parliamentary motion against a
long-discussed deal that would allow the Emirati company DP World to develop
Somaliland’s Berbera port – a deal Farmajo and his allies in parliament also have
opposed (see Section VII). This move allowed Jawari not only to demonstrate his
clout in parliament but also, reportedly, to pressure the Emiratis, who have built
close ties to Jawari’s rival for leadership of the Digil Mirifle clan, Sharif Hassan
Sheikh Aden, president of South West federal state.44 The speaker’s manoeuvres
illustrate the fluidity of Somali politicians’ ties to Gulf powers and the adroitness
with which many extract personal and political gain from foreign jostling for influence.
39 The UAE denies funding any individuals. A UAE official said, “there has never been any such
thing as supporting individuals or choosing sides”. Crisis Group interview, Abu Dhabi, May 2018.
40 Crisis Group interviews, Somali government officials, Mogadishu, 22 April 2018.
41 “Jawari calls for re-deployment of regular forces in parliament as he nods motion against him”,
Hiiran Online, March 18 2018.
42 Crisis Group interviews, Somali government officials, Mogadishu, 22 April 2018.
43 Crisis Group interviews, Somali political sources, Mogadishu, Nairobi, March, April 2018.
44 Ibid. Jawari also may have hoped to create potential legal leverage against the Farmajo administration
in its quest to engage with foreign companies from other countries.
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Jawari resigned on 9 April, reportedly when he realised that he would lose a government-
sponsored – and allegedly Qatar-funded – vote to oust him.45 Tensions
within parliament have subsided, though for how long is unclear. In principle, the
speaker’s departure could improve prospects for dialogue between the government
and its rivals, but the acrimonious nature of his exit appears to have entrenched
divisions. Parliamentarians admit that the overlap between parliamentary infighting
and the Gulf powers’ rivalry has increased opportunities for patronage.46
A second dispute involved opposition leader Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame.47
Over the course of 2017 and early 2018, Abdishakur levelled increasingly strident
critiques at the government. In response, senior officials accused him of receiving
Emirati funds and planning to destabilise the government.48 In December 2017,
Somali forces raided his Mogadishu residence. Five of his bodyguards died during
the raid. Abdishakur was held by security forces for three days, his passport confiscated
and was reportedly released only on condition he would not speak to the media
or leave the country.49 The government blames him and his guards for resisting a
routine search-and-interrogate operation and provoking the firefight.50
A day after the raid – while Abdishakur was still in detention – Farmajo sent a
minister to meet elders of his Habar Gedir clan to apologise and offer compensation
for the security guards’ deaths. The minister admitted “a mistake occurred” and
hinted officers misinterpreted orders.51 With no independent probe and two contrasting,
partisan narratives, the truth may never come to light. But whatever happened,
many Mogadishu residents blame the government. The opposition claims the
raid reflects its “growing authoritarian tendencies” and even calls for a caretaker
administration to oversee forthcoming elections, planned for 2020.52
A last clash involved Mogadishu mayor, Thabit Abdi Mohammed, a former
Farmajo ally from the powerful Abgaal clan, part of the Hawiye clan family. Thabit’s
response to the October 2017 Al-Shabaab attack at Soobe junction, the deadliest
45 See Harun Maruf, “Speaker of Somalia’s parliament resigns”, VOA, 9 April 2018. During the
standoff between Jawari and Kheyre, there were widespread rumours in Mogadishu that Jawari’s
resignation owed to Qatari funding of MPs, allegations again denied by Qatar. Crisis Group interviews,
Mogadishu, Doha, April 2018.
46 Crisis Group interview, Somali parliamentarian, Mogadishu, 21 April 2018.
47 Abdishakur is chairman of the Daljir party; a dual Somali-UK national; former minister of planning
in 2009, as well as a former leader of the negotiation committee of the Union of Islamic Courts
that briefly governed Mogadishu and much of south and central Somalia in 2006.
48 Somali officials allege that over the past two years Abdirahman received millions of dollars from
the UAE to destabilise the government and “buy his way” into Villa Somalia. Crisis Group interviews,
Mogadishu, Nairobi, February 2018. He denies the charges. See his op-ed, Abdirahman Abdishakur
Warsame, “Corroding our nascent democracy: How the government introduced a rule of
tyranny in Somalia”, Goobjoog News (goobjoog.com), 5 January 2018.
49 “Somalia: Politician Abdirahman Abdishakur released from jail”, All Africa (allafrica.com), 21
December 2017.
50 “Somali security forces arrest former minister in raid”, Reuters, 18 December 2017.
51 Crisis Group interview, opposition activist, Mogadishu, December 2017.
52 Crisis Group interview, opposition leader, Mogadishu, February 2018.
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terrorist attack suffered by the capital, won him considerable applause.53 Despite his
initially close ties to the government, he became a more prominent critic as his
popularity grew. He also championed the longstanding Hawiye demand that greater
Mogadishu, estimated to host over two million inhabitants (of a total estimated fourteen
million in Somalia), should be designated a federal state – called Banaadir –
which would allow it greater self-governance and representatives in parliament’s
upper house. Thabit appears to have promoted the capital’s statehood mostly to
build his own support base.
Instead of seeking to turn down the temperature, the government picked a public
fight with the mayor, accusing him of corruption and, again, of receiving Emirati
funds. In January, it deployed forces to take control of the national Banaadir regional
headquarters, which houses the mayor’s office. The next morning Thabit resigned.
While Thabit’s opportunism in promoting Mogadishu’s statehood might have justified
his removal, the manner in which it happened solidified opposition to the government.
Shortly after his replacement, Engineer Abdirahman Osman Yarisow, took
over, Qatar donated 30 buses to the mayor’s office.54 As the UAE shut down its aid
projects after the April 2018 seizure of its funds at Mogadishu airport, the mayor reportedly
asked Qatar to assume responsibility for some of those projects.55
To some degree, all these disputes are extensions of traditional Somali factionalism.
The precise impact of the Gulf crisis on them is difficult to ascertain, given the
difficulty of linking often opaque foreign funding directly to politicians’ actions and
the fact that the government, either overreading Emirati influence or using it as a
pretext, has cracked down even on opponents whose UAE ties are unclear.56 That
said, Gulf rivalries – whether directly or indirectly – appear almost certain to have
exacerbated divisions, hardening both the government’s and its rivals’ positions and
complicating efforts to reach consensus. They have added a thorny new layer to elite
struggles in the capital.
53 Thabit arrived quickly on the scene after the attack and mobilised support for victims. See
“Somalia: Mayor Thabit opens counselling center for October 14 victims”, All Africa (allafrica.com),
24 October 2017.
54 “Qatar donates 30 buses, two cranes to Somalia”, Gulf Times, 18 April 2018.
55 Crisis Group interview, Qatar Development Fund official, Doha, April 2018.
56 For example, according to one Turkish former diplomat: “Farmajo was unjust about Jawari, who
was not the UAE’s man. The president has cracked down on people who could have been aligned,
even sometimes on pro-Turkey figures. Some of those he cracked down on were definitely not pro-
UAE. Over time, the public of Somalia will get frustrated, and Farmajo and Qatar will both lose if
they do this”. Crisis Group interview, Ankara, May 2018.
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IV. Fracturing the Security Sector?
The UAE versus Qatar/Turkey rivalry also appears to be aggravating factionalism
within the security forces. This dissension risks undermining the campaign against
Al-Shabaab and could stoke future conflict, given that it often mirrors political divides.
Security sector divisions are hardly new. Much of the Somali army is a patchwork
of former clan militias, whose primary loyalty is often to commanders or elders rather
than up the formal chain of command.57 Nor is the UAE’s support – or that of other
countries – for the security forces new. As part of a memorandum of understanding
it signed with the Somali federal government in 2014, the UAE has trained personnel
and built infrastructure for the Somali army, marine police and regular police force,
including beyond Mogadishu.58 Its initial support for counter-piracy operations in
the 2010s has gradually morphed into the struggle against Al-Shabaab, which is the
primary focus today.59
For example, the UAE ran a training camp in Mogadishu and paid the salaries of
Somali trainees. It also trained, kitted out and paid the salaries of the Puntland
Marine Police Force, which focuses on maritime security and counter-terrorism
operations.60 Abu Dhabi has also trained and helped command specialised brigades
of the Somali army.61 In May 2015, it donated armoured vehicles to Jubaland state.62
Some officers and other civil servants have also gone for training in Dubai.63 Abu
Dhabi argues that its efforts have been coordinated with those of Western governments
in Somalia.64
Similarly, Turkish investment in the security sector dates back a number of years.
Since 2011, the Turkish government has been training Somali forces both in Somalia
and in Turkey.65 In October 2017, it commissioned a new military academy (estimated
to have cost $50 million) in Mogadishu to train 10,000 Somali soldiers in the next
few years. The academy, the construction of which had been long in the works and
coordinated with other donors including the U.S. and European Union (EU), cements
Turkey’s role as a major security player.66 Turkey has long supported creating a
strong Somali military, arguing that security is a prerequisite for addressing the fragile
nation’s dire humanitarian needs.67 Qatar, which has traditionally steered clear of
57 See Crisis Group Report, Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life Support, op. cit.,
pp. 15-16.
58 “Abdullah bin Zayed receives Somali defence minister”, WAM, 7 November 2014.
59 Crisis Group interview, senior UAE official, Abu Dhabi, March 2018.
60 Crisis Group interview, UAE official, Abu Dhabi, May 2018.
61 Crisis Group interviews, former U.S. official, Washington, May 2018; government official, Abu
Dhabi, March 2018.
62“Jubaland receives delivery of rare military hardware from UAE”, Goobjoog News, 26 May 2015.
63 Crisis Group interview, UAE official, Abu Dhabi, May 2018.
64 A U.S. defence official agreed that there was “if not always outright coordination then at least
awareness on the U.S. side” of Emirati operations. Crisis Group phone interview, April 2018.
65 “Turkey’s military move into Somalia, after backing Qatar in Gulf crisis”, Newsweek, 8 July 2017.
An “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the
Republic of Somalia on Military Training Cooperation”, was signed on 22 May 2010 in Ankara.
66 Harun Maruf, “Turkey gives weapons to Somali soldiers”, VOA, 5 January 2018.
67 “Turkey to lobby for Somalia’s security”, Hürriye Daily News, 6 December 2012.
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the security sphere, may be considering a shift. After a Somali military delegation
met Defence Minister Khalid Bin Muhammad al-Attiyah in Doha in March 2018,
Qatar – according to a senior Somali official – pledged to construct new Somali
army barracks.68 Qatari officials say talks between Doha and the federal government
about supporting security sector reform are ongoing.69
Over the past year, however, the escalating rivalries among Gulf powers and Turkey
appear to have brought troublesome new dynamics to their assistance. Specialised
units trained and equipped by rival powers reportedly face pressure to lend
their weight to competing political factions.70 The 30 December 2017 raid on Senator
Abdi Hasan Awale Qeybdiid’s residence in Mogadishu by UAE-trained troops revealed
the disconnect between the various security forces operating in the capital.71 Farmajo’s
government claims it had no knowledge of the attack on the senator’s house. Farmajo
himself ordered the arrest of more than 40 UAE-trained army troops and launched
an investigation into the raid.72 Somali officials accuse UAE-trained units of carrying
out operations not sanctioned through the regular chain of command, in some cases
defying orders and seeking to “protect” individuals deemed to be government
opponents.73
The UAE denies this charge, arguing that its trainees fall under the command of
the Defence Ministry, together with AMISOM (both of which had sanctioned the
training program).74 As the Emiratis announced in April they were ending military
cooperation with the Somali government, the government assumed full command of
the Mogadishu-based, Emirati-trained unit at a special ceremony in the capital.75
The threat of greater factionalism is all the more worrying given the dysfunction
that already wracks the security forces.76 A 2017 operational readiness assessment
revealed that the army “lacked the properly trained manpower, barracks, weapons
and ammunition, as well as logistical support …. The Somali national army needs to
68 Crisis Group Skype interview, senior Somali official, May 2018; “Qatar to build SNA military bases
In Somalia”, Radio Dalsan, 13 March 2018.
69 Crisis Group email correspondence, Qatari foreign ministry official, May 2018.
70 Crisis Group interviews, Somali security sources, Mogadishu, February 2018.
71 “Raid on senator’s home reveals divisions in Somali security forces”, Newsweek, 30
December 2017.
72 An Emirati official claims the raid was a set-up, based on an intentionally false tip that Al-
Shabaab was in the villa. Crisis Group interview, Abu Dhabi, May 2018.
73 Crisis Group interviews, Somali officials, Mogadishu, February, March 2018. Some cite in particular
an operation which saw Emirati-trained units protect Hassan Moalim, a parliamentarian.
74 Crisis Group interview, UAE official, Abu Dhabi, May 2018.
75 Initial reports of discontent within that unit – partly triggered by reports its members raided
their armoury and stole hundreds of rifles (allegedly later sold at the Cirtokte arms market) – have
since subsided but long-term issues of integration, stipends, command and control will take time to
settle. See Abdi Sheikh and Feisal Omar, “Exclusive: Weapons stolen from UAE training facility in
Somalia, sold on open market”, Reuters, 25 April 2018.
76 After the October 2017 truck bombing in Mogadishu, Hussein Moalim Mohamud Sheikh Ali, a
former national security adviser to the president, said the Somali security services and the donor
nations working with them are both to blame for disorganised security. “Deadly Somalia blast
reveals flaws in intelligence efforts”, Reuters, 20 October 2017.
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be capacitated in all fields – training, equipment, mobility and weapons – to be able
to inherit, hold and preserve the gains achieved”.77
On assuming office, Farmajo promised to rebuild the army and crush the insurgency
within two years. In May 2017, his government unveiled a national security
pact at the London conference. This pact was backed not only by donors but by federal
states, suggesting a degree of consensus between Mogadishu and the regions
that has since dissipated.
But Al-Shabaab remains a formidable force, with clear command-and-control
within its ranks, a ruthless intelligence apparatus, and a revenue generation system
and ability to deliver basic services, particularly dispute resolution, that outstrip
those of Mogadishu.78 U.S. airstrikes and ground operations since early 2017 may
have taken a toll on its leadership and assets, but such tactics are unlikely to defeat
the insurgency. Indeed, in some cases the civilian casualties they cause drive up support
for militants.79 In response, Al-Shabaab has stepped up attacks, carrying out
over a dozen in Mogadishu over the past eighteen months. The uncertainty over the
continued presence of African Union forces – AMISOM announced in late 2017 it
would begin a phased exit – serves to deepen unease inside and outside the country.
Factionalism in Mogadishu and potentially within the security sector, together with
Mogadishu-federal states tension described in the next section, distract from efforts
to counter Al-Shabaab and risk playing into the insurgency’s hands.
77 “SRSG Michael Keating’s Situation in Somalia Briefing at the UNSC (S/2017/1109)”, Security
Council Report (www.securitycouncilreport.org), 24 January 2018.
78 Crisis Group Briefing, Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War, op. cit.
79 Crisis Group interviews, Mogadishu, February 2018; see also “Somalis protest military raid that
killed 10 civilians”, VOA, 26 August 2017.
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V. Mogadishu-Federal State Government Friction
President Farmajo, who hails from outside traditional Mogadishu elites, came to
power enjoying considerable support from beyond the capital. The Gulf crisis, however,
has helped catalyse escalating tension between his government and Somalia’s
federal states, some of which rely on Emirati aid and investment.
The UAE has been involved in Somali regions for a number of years. Receiving
minimal funding from Mogadishu, some federal state leaders see Emirati support as
key to rebuilding their economies and infrastructure.80 Following the outbreak of the
Gulf crisis, senior Somali officials and Western diplomats believe that Abu Dhabi
quietly stepped up offers of support, particularly to federal states located along the
coast, whose ports make them of greater strategic interest.81 Abu Dhabi, meanwhile,
says that its policy has been consistent, and only the Somali government’s perception
of it has changed.82 One official said: “If we can’t be there through the federal
government, we think it’s better that we keep our relationships with the federal
states. They recognise what the UAE has done to support their development …. We
don’t want them to collapse”.83
Whatever the case, federal state governments adopted an increasingly assertive
posture against Farmajo. In August and September 2017, they released a series of
statements expressing support for the Saudi-Emirati bloc, contradicting Farmajo’s
declared desire not to pick sides, and in one case openly attacking Mogadishu’s
supposedly neutral position.84 Federal state officials express frustration that the
government did not consult them as it adopted a position on the Gulf crisis that they
believe works against their interests. In turn, many in Mogadishu – including civil
society leaders and diplomats, not just government officials – perceive that resistance
in part as sparked by Emirati funds and as a means of pressuring Farmajo to distance
himself from Qatar.85
The Farmajo government objects that federal states’ stance on the Gulf spat undercuts
Somali foreign policy, which is Mogadishu’s prerogative. It also views growing
80 The UAE interprets the Somali constitution as granting the regions full autonomy on signing
economic and commercial agreements. Crisis Group interview, Abu Dhabi, May 2018. The 2012
provisional constitution’s Chapter 5, Article 54 states: “The allocation of powers and resources shall
be negotiated and agreed upon by the Federal Government and the Federal Member States (pending
the formation of Federal Member States), except in matters concerning: (A) Foreign Affairs, (B)
National Defense, (C) Citizenship and Immigration [and] (D) Monetary Policy, which shall be within
the powers and responsibilities of the federal government”. See http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/
research/Somalia-Constitution2012.pdf.
81 Crisis Group interviews with diplomats, cross-section of Somalis (business leaders, civil society
activists, intellectuals), Mogadishu, Nairobi, February, March and April 2018.
82 Crisis Group interviews, senior UAE official, Abu Dhabi, March 2018; UAE official, Abu Dhabi,
May 2018.
83 Crisis Group interview, Abu Dhabi, May 2018.
84 “Somalia: Federal government hits back regional states; reaffirms its neutrality in Gulf crisis”,
Horn Observer, 21 September 2017.
85 Crisis Group interviews with diplomats, civil society representatives, federal state officials, Nairobi,
February-April 2018; Qatari official, phone, April 2018. A UAE official contested this claim: “It
is not the case. We are never interested in the breakdown of a state”. Crisis Group interview, UAE
official, Abu Dhabi, May 2018.
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commercial and military assistance funnelled directly to the regions as a threat, likely
to diminish its already shaky influence in the regions and embolden an assertive
periphery. Other foreign powers have their own ties to federal states, but the Somali
government argues that they usually coordinate with Mogadishu or at least keep it
informed.86 Qatari officials, for example, argue explicitly that, unlike the UAE, they
channel aid only through the federal government “to protect Somalia’s territorial integrity”
and accuse Abu Dhabi of seeking to regionally divide Somalia.87 The Somali
government echoes that charge.88
The friction may have hurt counter-insurgency efforts. The security pact unveiled
at the London conference, shortly after Farmajo’s inauguration and before the June
2017 Gulf crisis, envisaged federal states’ forces becoming part of the Somali army
and the establishment of federal and regional state police departments.89 All federal
states and donors signed up to the pact, which set a six-month deadline for the reforms.
That deadline has since been missed, partly due to political infighting in the
capital but also to Mogadishu-federal state tensions.90
Meetings between the government and regional representatives in the latter part
of 2017 had appeared to make some progress on easing the standoff. But 2018 has
brought fresh strain, as news broke that the UAE-based conglomerate DP World was
in direct negotiations with Puntland, South West State and Jubaland for the development
of those federal states’ ports and to increase other investment.91 The visits of
the Puntland and Jubaland leaders to Dubai in late April and their subsequent reiteration
of calls for continued Emirati funding have stoked further tension.92
Then, in mid-May, during a meeting in Baidoa, the capital of Somalia’s South-
West federal state, all the federal state leaders issued a hard-hitting statement accusing
the Somali government of violating Article 53 of the provisional constitution,
86 Crisis Group interviews, government officials, Mogadishu, February-April 2018.
87 Crisis Group interview, Qatari foreign ministry official, Doha, April 2018. Another official said:
“The Somalis recently have asked the international community before the UN Security Council to
denounce UAE interference in the internal affairs of Somalia. We have to support their call. If the
UAE continues its policies in Somalia, this country will be destroyed, just as the UAE is doing to
Yemen”. Crisis Group interview, Qatari official, phone, April 2018.
88 According to one minister, the Emiratis “convened meetings for federal state leaders to undermine
the national government”. Crisis Group interview, Mogadishu, April 2018.
89 The text of the pact is online at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/london-somaliaconference-
2017-security-pact.
90 See “State forces to be integrated into national army and police in 3 months”, Goobjoog News,
20 April 2017.
91 In an October 2017 meeting, the federal and state governments agreed on the imperative of
restoring relations. A follow-up meeting in December included concrete discussions on power and
resource sharing, but after that talks petered out. Regarding DP World, the UAE insists that it is a
commercial operation independent from Emirati foreign policy. Crisis Group interview, senior UAE
official, Abu Dhabi, March 2018. Diplomats in Abu Dhabi representing three different Western
countries questioned this independence, with one stating: “When we raise it in conversations, they
[UAE] always say DP World is a private company and acting out of commercial interests, but clearly
those interests align with UAE foreign policy”. Crisis Group interviews, Abu Dhabi, April 2018.
92 “Somalia: Puntland can reach deals with foreign governments, says president”, Garowe Online,
26 April 2018. “UAE role is crucial, says Somali regional leader”, The National, 26 April 2018. The
Jubaland leader claims to have been paying a doctor’s visit.
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which calls for consultation on all local and foreign policy issues. They claimed the
deterioration in relations with the UAE was not in the national interest and appealed
to Mogadishu to seek to reverse it. They also called on donors to disperse aid directly
to federal states, bypassing Mogadishu.93
Senior Somali officials express increasing anger at the federal states’ actions.
“They will lose if they side with Emiratis”, said one. “The bulk of the nation is with us
because they want to defend Somali sovereignty and resent seeing Abu Dhabi try to
compel us to take their side. The power-hungry federal state leaders will isolate
themselves. Many of the federal states will have elections in two years and will be
voted out”.94 Overall, political hostility between Mogadishu and regional governments
is at its worst level in years, threatening to further fracture the country.
93 “Somalia: Council of Interstate Cooperation (CIC) – Communique 13-16 May, 2018, Baidoa”,
available here: https://minbane.wordpress.com/2018/05/16/https-wp-me-p1xtjg-6wu-3.
94 Crisis Group interview, senior official, Mogadishu, 25 April 2018.
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VI. A Dangerous Spat with Somaliland
Gulf rivalries and Farmajo’s heavy-handedness also have played into a deepening
row between Mogadishu and the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. Shortly after
Farmajo’s June 2017 announcement that Somalia would not pick sides, Somaliland
appeared set to chart its own course, declaring it would ban Qatar Airways from
using its airspace.95 Over the past few months, a deal that Somaliland has signed to
allow DP World to develop its Berbera port has provoked an angry response from
Mogadishu.
Somaliland’s relations with Somalia have been frosty since 1991, when the central
government in Mogadishu collapsed and the region declared independence. Its
statehood is recognised by neither Somalia nor any other state (though a handful of
governments admit travellers on Somaliland passports). Years of diplomatic efforts
by African and international actors to nudge the two toward dialogue yielded little.
In 2016, fresh talks between representatives of both the Somali and Somaliland governments,
mediated by Turkey and supported by the UK and others, appeared to
breathe new life into prospects for some form of resolution.
An escalating war of words between Mogadishu and Hargeisa over a deal formalised
in March 2018, between the Somaliland government and DP World, appears to
have extinguished hope of any such rapprochement.96 According to the $442 million
deal, the Emirati conglomerate would modernise and manage Berbera port, with DP
World holding 51 per cent of shares, Somaliland 30 per cent and Ethiopia 19 per
cent.97 Farmajo’s government has reacted angrily. Prime Minister Kheyre, who argues
that he travelled to the UAE in an attempt to block it, was particularly incensed by
the manner in which he learned of it:
I was in Abu Dhabi recently and met senior Emirati officials to express our concerns
about the Berbera deal and find a solution. I told them Somalia wanted to
be a country that gets along with everyone. But even as we were talking, the
Emiratis were secretly negotiating with Somaliland on the Berbera contract. They
did not even take the trouble to inform me. I only learned of it when I was about
to board my flight home.98
Mogadishu formally protested to the Arab League, declaring the contract null and
void and “a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty”.99 Shortly thereafter, parliament’s
lower house adopted a motion, as described above, rejecting the deal. It took the
95 “Breaking: Somaliland sides with UAE and Saudi Arabia against Qatar”, The National (Hargeisa),
6 June 2017. In reality, Somaliland has no authority to ban airlines from using its airspace.
96 Though Somaliland President Muse Bihi signed the lease for the port in Dubai in February 2018,
negotiations have been ongoing since 2015. “Dubai’s DP World agrees to manage port in Somaliland
for 30 years”, Wall Street Journal, 30 May 2016.
97 “DP World signs agreement with Somaliland and Ethiopia”, Gulf News, 1 March 2018; “Mogadishu
fires broadside at UAE”, Africa Confidential, 21 March 2108. Ethiopia’s participation in the deal is
another sore point for Farmajo’s nationalist supporters.
98 Crisis Group interview, Prime Minister Hassan Ali Kheyre, Mogadishu, 24 April 2018.
99 “Somalia protests to AU & Arab League over Berbera port deal”, Radio Dalsan (radiodalsan.com),
8 March 2018.
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additional step of banning DP World from operating in Somalia, potentially obstructing
the company’s attempts to secure contracts to develop federal states’ ports.
In response, Somaliland President Muse Bihi ominously described Somalia’s
opposition to the Berbera deal as “a declaration of war”, adding “we are ready for
you”.100 For their part, the Emiratis claim to have been taken aback by Mogadishu’s
anger. According to one official:
The Somalis surprised us with the complaint at the Arab League about trampling
on their sovereignty. We have been consistent in our One Somalia policy. We had
an oral agreement [about this] and we can’t accept that a new government comes
in [and changes everything]. This has to be understood as a commercial and
development project.101
Somaliland similarly contends that the federal government had been aware of negotiations
over Berbera’s development for more than a year before the contract was
signed (Farmajo’s predecessor, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, reportedly at one point
considered whether the Somali government itself might become a partner).102 Moreover,
the deal comes against the backdrop of renewed efforts to start a fresh round of
talks, mediated by Djibouti, between Somaliland and Somalia, with a face-to-face
meeting planned between Farmajo and Muse Bihi.103
Deepening animosity over the past year between the Somali government and Abu
Dhabi clearly has played into the dispute. Farmajo’s stance on the Dubai port could
prove a misstep. Mogadishu mostly likely lacks the leverage to block the deal, and its
inability to do so could make it look still weaker in the eyes of federal states, increasing
the likelihood they chart an even more autonomous course in striking their own
deals. Attempting to scupper the deal also risks damaging prospects for dialogue and
a negotiated settlement to the dispute over Somaliland’s status. It is likely to complicate
any attempt to calm the recent outbreak of violence between Somaliland and
Puntland forces.104
100 “Somaliland: President accuses Somalia of declaring war against Somaliland”, Horn Diplomat
(www.horndiplomat.com), 8 March 2018.
101 Crisis Group interview, UAE senior official, March 2018.
102“Ex-PM rubbishes Dubai claims of inking MOU on Berbera port deal with Somalia”, Hiiran
Online, 22 April 2018.
103 “Somalia: Who is facilitating Somali-Somaliland talks?” Garowe Online, 19 February 2018.
104 Puntland and Somaliland have been engaged in sporadic conflict over the disputed Sool region
for more than ten years. People who live there are divided over which side to back. In May, the two
sides fought fiercely over control of the Tuka Raq village, which had been seized by Somaliland in
April. The village is close to Garowe, the capital of Puntland. “Dozens die in fighting between two
Somali states over disputed land”, Reuters, 17 May 2018.
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Crisis Group Africa Report N°260, 5 June 2018 Page 19
VII. Taking a Step Back
Of all the African states forced to navigate the rivalries unleashed by the Gulf crisis,
Somalia faces the gravest challenges. The UAE, alarmed at losing ground to its main
geopolitical rivals, appears to have upped support for Somali opposition leaders and
federal states in an attempt to promote its interests and protect its investments. The
Somali government, feeling besieged, has deepened ties to Qatar and Turkey, further
fuelling Emirati disquiet, and adopted heavy-handed tactics against rivals at home,
aggravating Somali factionalism. The result has been a dangerous standoff, pitting
the government against opponents in Mogadishu, the federal states and Somaliland.
Any of these disputes could escalate. All sides need to take a step back before that
happens.
Repairing Mogadishu-Abu Dhabi relations will be an uphill struggle. Sentiment is
raw on both sides, particularly since the government’s seizure of Emirati money in
Mogadishu in April 2018 and the UAE’s subsequent withdrawal. Some Somali officials
threaten retaliatory steps against what they view as an attempt to violate their
country’s sovereignty. According to a Somali minister:
The UAE is undermining our sovereignty. We engage them and express our concerns.
They continue to escalate. We have shown restraint and have not taken retaliatory
measures. They sent a ship to evacuate their people and equipment. We
said: fine. But they convened meetings for federal state leaders to undermine the
national government. They will lose in the longer term because public opinion is
with us. Indeed, our government has benefited from the crisis as the people are
rallying around us. So far, we are giving space for dialogue. But we can respond
in kind. We have contingency measures. We could, for example, deny the Emirates
overflight rights over Somalia – tens of daily Emirates flights use Somali airspace.
We could reopen the Iranian embassy in Mogadishu. We don’t want to do
either, but we could.105
Senior Emirati officials have tended to express similar anger.106 That said, despite
the heated rhetoric, both sides appear to want to find a way out. According to Emirati
officials, Abu Dhabi recognises that it needs to de-escalate the dispute. One pointed
out that the UAE has neither closed its embassy nor downgraded diplomatic relations
with Mogadishu – an intentional move to avoid escalation and leave the door
open for re-engagement with Farmajo’s government.107 Another said: “We don’t
want to disconnect ourselves from the Somali government, even though we are reluctant
to engage with them …. What we need now really is for things to just calm
down. They will cool. Then a mediator could come in”.108
105 Crisis Group interview, Mogadishu, April 2018. In reality, Somalia would be challenged to prevent
other countries from using its airspace.
106 In March 2018, for example, a senior UAE official told Crisis Group: “We have been in Somalia
in the darkest hours. You can’t treat us like this when we have had boots on the ground, trainers
with the security forces, counter-piracy operations. We have built wells, hospitals, schools”. Crisis
Group interview, Abu Dhabi, March 2018.
107 Crisis Group interview, UAE official, Abu Dhabi, May 2018.
108 Crisis Group interview, UAE official, Abu Dhabi, May 2018.
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Crisis Group Africa Report N°260, 5 June 2018 Page 20
Senior Somali officials argue that they have reached out to the UAE since the
start of the crisis. Privately, they acknowledge that escalation helps them in the short
term by solidifying public support for the government, but will hurt them in the long
term, as it will weaken Somalia and, by distracting the government itself, help Al-
Shabaab.109 That said, they are clear they will not offer compromises they believe
could be seen as surrendering Somali sovereignty – so no public apologies or removal
of officials of concern to Abu Dhabi.110
Some form of Mogadishu-Abu Dhabi dialogue is a priority and could aim for
rapprochement based on the Somali government taking steps to showcase its neutrality
and the UAE pledging to keep Mogadishu better informed on its involvement
in federal states. Even without such dialogue, President Farmajo’s government should
urgently seek accommodation with rivals in the capital, federal states and Hargeisa.
In this light, the Somali government should:
 Express publicly its willingness to participate in talks with Abu Dhabi and potentially
seek Saudi mediation. It also could find a way to distribute the Emirati
money it has seized to pay salaries of personnel in the units for which Abu Dhabi
says the cash was destined. It could pledge to guarantee the security of Emirati
diplomats and military personnel. Senior officials also should dial down their anti-
Emirati rhetoric.
 Stop the selective criminalisation of clientelism, notably its crackdown on rivals
under the pretext they receive UAE funding. The influence of foreign funds on
Somali politics has long been a concern, but the opposition is not the only guilty
party. The government also should promote financial transparency; its annual
report on aid flows is a good start, but it and federal state governments should
declare significant donations.111
 Step up efforts to finalise the draft permanent constitution – which would clarify
the power and resource-sharing arrangements with federal states that are at the
root of centre-periphery tensions – including by resuming the dialogue with federal
states it started in October 2017.
 Recommit to a meeting between President Farmajo and Somaliland leader Muse
Bihi; Bihi should make the same commitment. As a gesture of good-will to both
Somaliland and the UAE, Mogadishu also should curtail its opposition to Hargeisa’s
contract with DP World, a deal long in the making.
For their part, Gulf powers and Turkey should exercise restraint across the Horn,
particularly in Somalia. The factious nature of Somali politics means that no axis can
fully dominate. Attempting to consolidate control is likely to further fracture the
109 Crisis Group interview, senior Somali official, Mogadishu, April 2018. He added: “Many among
us lack experience in governing. We might be overconfident in believing we can bank on popular
support and face down the UAE. It could cost us down the road”. Ibid.
110 Crisis Group interview, senior Somali officials, Mogadishu, April 2018.
111 “Aid Flows in Somalia: Analysis of Aid Flow Data”, Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic
Development, Federal Republic of Somalia, March 2008 (www.somaliaaidflows.so).
Somalia and the Gulf Crisis
Crisis Group Africa Report N°260, 5 June 2018 Page 21
Somali state, either along factional lines in the capital or between Mogadishu and
the federal states. Such fragmentation would serve nobody’s interests.
 The UAE should agree to dialogue and could offer to share information with
Mogadishu on all DP World’s dealings with Somali regions and Somaliland. Its
existing diplomatic overtures to federal states and Somaliland are provocative; if
it is intent on maintaining relationships and commercial ties, it should do so in a
way that doesn’t exacerbate Somali fractures. It also could encourage allies in the
federal states to reconcile with Mogadishu.
 Qatar and Turkey should press Farmajo to repair relations with rival factions,
federal states and Somaliland.112 They also should support its adoption of a more
balanced stand on the Gulf Cooperation Council crisis; Doha and Ankara may
benefit in the short term as the Emiratis withdraw, but for Somalia, a genuinely
neutral stance that allows it to receive much-needed support from donors of all
stripes would better serve its interests. Qatari-allied media should dial down
their inflammatory coverage of the UAE’s role in Somalia.
 Saudi Arabia, which enjoys the relative trust of Somali and Emirati leaders,
should promote dialogue between the Farmajo government and Abu Dhabi;
Riyadh could be an emissary and potential facilitator of talks.113
Somalia’s other partners should work to limit the impact of the Gulf rivalries. In particular,
the African Union, the United Nations, the regional body the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of Arab States, the U.S., the
EU and its member states should urge that all states cease covert sponsorship of
Somali leaders. Western powers with close ties to both the Somali government and
Gulf powers should promote Mogadishu-Abu Dhabi dialogue, and back any attempt
by Riyadh to mediate. EU officials, also reportedly trusted by both sides, might also
play some facilitation role.
112 A former Turkish diplomat acknowledged that Ankara could do so: “Those who think Turkey is
sided with Farmajo are wrong. But yes, Ankara could play more of a role to influence Farmajo, both
directly and via Qatar”. Crisis Group interview, Ankara, May 2018. A Turkish foreign ministry
official largely agreed: “Between March and April, Turkey had been calling for restraint in the confrontation
between Jawari and the prime minister and president. This is what Turkey can do, call
for dialogue and lowering of tensions. We will not get more involved in domestic politics or take
initiatives that call into question the president’s legitimacy, so we wouldn’t interfere beyond calling
for dialogue”. Crisis Group interview, Ankara, May 2018.
113 According to one senior Somali official: “We welcome Saudi mediation. We hope they can put
pressure on the UAE to change their attitude and policies toward Somalia”. Crisis Group interview,
Mogadishu, April 2018. A UAE official argued that, because the UAE has not downgraded ties, there
is no need for mediation. Crisis Group interview, Abu Dhabi, May 2018.
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Crisis Group Africa Report N°260, 5 June 2018 Page 22
VIII. Conclusion
Clearly, Somalia’s many challenges cannot all be pinned on Gulf powers, particularly
given that their aid and investment for years has been a lifeline for many Somalis.
Nor are Somali elites, long adept at navigating foreign clientelism, helpless victims.
Moreover, many foreign powers – in the region and beyond – have long played
favourites and aggravated factionalism in Somalia.
That said, almost a year after the Gulf crisis, the enmities that have riven the GCC
have brought fresh complexity to Somali instability. They illustrate, too, the increasing
jockeying for influence among Arab and other powers around the Red Sea and in
the Horn of Africa. The extension of the Middle East’s fault lines into the region have
unsettled already fraught relations among Horn states and led their leaders to recalibrate
their policies toward neighbours and outside powers alike.
Of all those states, it is Somalia – already arguably the weakest – whose internal
politics have been most fiercely buffeted, with rivalries among Gulf states and Turkey
and the unravelling of relations between the Farmajo government and Abu Dhabi
intensifying disputes among factions in Mogadishu, between the Somali government
and federal states, and between it and Somaliland. Even without Gulf meddling,
efforts to reconcile clans and overcome centre-periphery tensions – a prerequisite
for peace in Somalia – face an uphill battle. But if the country becomes a battleground
for richer, more powerful states, and they and Somali factions pursue a form
of zero-sum competition ill-suited to the country’s factious and multipolar politics,
the bloodshed and discord that have long blighted Somalia risk taking an even darker
turn. All involved need to reverse course before that happens. Ideally, the Gulf
powers would end the spat within the GCC that serves all their interests ill. But absent
that, they should not let their rivalries destabilise weaker states.
Nairobi/Brussels, 5 June 2018
Somalia and the Gulf Crisis
Crisis Group Africa Report N°260, 5 June 2018 Page 23
Appendix A: Map of the Gulf Region
Somalia and the Gulf Crisis
Crisis Group Africa Report N°260, 5 June 2018 Page 24
Appendix B: About the International Crisis Group
The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation,
with some 120 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level
advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.
Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or
close by countries or regions at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on
information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations
targeted at key international, regional and national decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes
CrisisWatch, a monthly early warning bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in
up to 70 situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.
Crisis Group’s reports are distributed widely by email and made available simultaneously on its website,
www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including
the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.
The Crisis Group Board of Trustees – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy,
business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations
to the attention of senior policymakers around the world. Crisis Group is chaired by former UN Deputy
Secretary-General and Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Lord Mark
Malloch-Brown. Its Vice Chair is Ayo Obe, a Legal Practitioner, Columnist and TV Presenter in Nigeria.
Crisis Group’s President & CEO, Robert Malley, took up the post on 1 January 2018. Malley was formerly
Crisis Group’s Middle East and North Africa Program Director and most recently was a Special Assistant
to former U.S. President Barack Obama as well as Senior Adviser to the President for the Counter-ISIL
Campaign, and White House Coordinator for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf region. Previously,
he served as President Bill Clinton’s Special Assistant for Israeli-Palestinian Affairs.
Crisis Group’s international headquarters is in Brussels, and the organisation has offices in ten other locations:
Bishkek, Bogota, Dakar, Kabul, Islamabad, Istanbul, Nairobi, London, New York, and Washington,
DC. It has presences in the following locations: Abuja, Algiers, Bangkok, Beirut, Caracas, Gaza City,
Guatemala City, Hong Kong, Jerusalem, Johannesburg, Juba, Mexico City, New Delhi, Rabat, Sanaa,
Tblisi, Toronto, Tripoli, Tunis, and Yangon.
Crisis Group receives financial support from a wide range of governments, foundations, and private
sources. Currently Crisis Group holds relationships with the following governmental departments and
agencies: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Austrian Development Agency, Danish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union Instrument contributing to
Stability and Peace, European Commission, Directorate General for Neighbourhood Enlargement Negotiations,
Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, French Development Agency, French Ministry of Europe and
Foreign Affairs, Irish Aid, Japan International Cooperation Agency, Principality of Liechtenstein, Luxembourg
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Norwegian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.
Crisis Group also holds relationships with the following foundations: Carnegie Corporation of New York,
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Henry Luce Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Konrad
Adenauer Stiftung, Korea Foundation, Oak Foundation, Omidyar Network Fund, Open Society Foundations,
Ploughshares Fund, Robert Bosch Stiftung, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and Wellspring Philanthropic
Fund.
June 2018
Somalia and the Gulf Crisis
Crisis Group Africa Report N°260, 5 June 2018 Page 25
Appendix C: Reports and Briefings on Africa since 2015
Special Reports
Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic
State, Special Report N°1, 14 March 2016 (also
available in Arabic and French).
Seizing the Moment: From Early Warning to Early
Action, Special Report N°2, 22 June 2016.
Counter-terrorism Pitfalls: What the U.S. Fight
against ISIS and al-Qaeda Should Avoid,
Special Report N°3, 22 March 2017.
Central Africa
Elections in Burundi: Moment of Truth, Africa
Report N°224, 17 April 2015 (also available in
French).
Congo: Is Democratic Change Possible?, Africa
Report N°225, 5 May 2015.
Burundi: Peace Sacrificed?, Africa Briefing
N°111, 29 May 2015 (also available in
French).
Cameroon: The Threat of Religious Radicalism,
Africa Report N°229, 3 September 2015 (also
available in French).
Central African Republic: The Roots of Violence,
Africa Report N°230, 21 September 2015 (also
available in French).
Chad: Between Ambition and Fragility, Africa
Report N°233, 30 March 2016 (also available
in French).
Burundi: anatomie du troisième mandat, Africa
Report N°235, 20 May 2016 (only available in
French).
Katanga: Tensions in DRC’s Mineral Heartland,
Africa Report N°239, 3 August 2016.
The African Union and the Burundi Crisis: Ambition
versus Reality, Africa Briefing N°122, 28
September 2016 (also available in French).
Boulevard of Broken Dreams: The “Street” and
Politics in DR Congo, Africa Briefing N°123, 13
October 2016.
Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram, Africa Report
N°241, 16 November 2016 (also available
in French).
Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military
Measures, Africa Report N°246, 8 March 2017
(also available in French).
Burundi: The Army in Crisis, Africa Report
N°247, 5 April 2017 (also available in French).
Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis at the Crossroads,
Africa Report N°250, 2 August 2017
(also available in French).
Avoiding the Worst in Central African Republic,
Africa Report N°253, 28 September 2017 (also
available in French).
Time to Reset African Union-European Union
Relations, Africa Report N°255, 17 October
2017 (also available in French).
Cameroon: A Worsening Anglophone Crisis
Calls for Strong Measures, Africa Briefing
N°130, 19 October 2017 (also available in
French).
Cameroon’s Far North: Reconstruction amid
Ongoing Conflict, Africa Briefing N°133, 25
October 2017 (also available in French).
Time for Concerted Action in DR Congo, Africa
Report N°257, 4 December 2017 (also available
in French).
Seven Priorities for the African Union in 2018,
Africa Briefing N°135, 17 January 2018 (also
available in French).
Electoral Poker in DR Congo, Africa Report
N°259, 4 April 2018 (also available in French).
Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis: How the Catholic
Church Can Promote Dialogue, Africa Briefing
N°138, 26 April 2018 (also available in
French).
Horn of Africa
Sudan and South Sudan’s Merging Conflicts,
Africa Report N°223, 29 January 2015.
Sudan: The Prospects for “National Dialogue”,
Africa Briefing N°108, 11 March 2015.
The Chaos in Darfur, Africa Briefing N°110, 22
April 2015.
South Sudan: Keeping Faith with the IGAD
Peace Process, Africa Report N°228, 27 July
2015.
Somaliland: The Strains of Success, Africa Briefing
N°113, 5 October 2015.
Kenya’s Somali North East: Devolution and Security,
Africa Briefing N°114, 17 November 2015.
Ethiopia: Governing the Faithful, Africa Briefing
N°117, 22 February 2016.
Sudan’s Islamists: From Salvation to Survival,
Africa Briefing N°119, 21 March 2016.
South Sudan’s South: Conflict in the Equatorias,
Africa Report N°236, 25 May 2016.
Kenya’s Coast: Devolution Disappointed, Africa
Briefing N°121, 13 July 2016.
South Sudan: Rearranging the Chessboard, Africa
Report N°243, 20 December 2016.
Instruments of Pain (II): Conflict and Famine in
South Sudan, Africa Briefing N°124, 26 April
2017.
Instruments of Pain (III): Conflict and Famine in
Somalia, Africa Briefing N°125, 9 May 2017.
Instruments of Pain (IV): The Food Crisis in
North East Nigeria, Africa Briefing N°126, 18
May 2017.
Kenya’s Rift Valley: Old Wounds, Devolution’s
New Anxieties, Africa Report N°248, 30 May
2017.
Time to Repeal U.S. Sanctions on Sudan?, Africa
Briefing N°127, 22 June 2017.
Somalia and the Gulf Crisis
Crisis Group Africa Report N°260, 5 June 2018 Page 26
A New Roadmap to Make U.S. Sudan Sanctions
Relief Work, Africa Briefing N°128, 29 September
2017.
How to Ensure a Credible, Peaceful Presidential
Vote in Kenya, Africa Briefing N°129,
2 October 2017.
Managing the Disruptive Aftermath of Somalia’s
Worst Terror Attack, Africa Briefing N°131, 20
October 2017.
An Election Delay Can Help Avert Kenya’s Crisis,
Africa Briefing N°132, 23 October 2017.
Uganda’s Slow Slide into Crisis, Africa Report
N°256, 21 November 2017.
After Kenya’s Leaders Reconcile, a Tough Path
Ahead, Africa Briefing N°136, 13 March 2018.
Southern Africa
Zimbabwe: Stranded in Stasis, Africa Briefing
N°118, 29 February 2016.
Zimbabwe’s “Military-assisted Transition” and
Prospects for Recovery, Africa Briefing N°134,
20 December 2017.
West Africa
Burkina Faso: Nine Months to Complete the
Transition, Africa Report N°222, 28 January
2015.
Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau: An
Opportunity Not to Be Missed, Africa Briefing
N°109, 19 March 2015 (only available in
French).
Mali: An Imposed Peace?, Africa Report N°226,
22 May 2015 (only available in French).
Burkina Faso: Meeting the October Target,
Africa Briefing N°112, 24 June 2015 (only
available in French).
The Central Sahel: A Perfect Sandstorm, Africa
Report N°227, 25 June 2015 (also available in
French).
Curbing Violence in Nigeria (III): Revisiting the
Niger Delta, Africa Report N°231, 29
September 2015.
The Politics Behind the Ebola Crisis, Africa
Report N°232, 28 October 2015.
Mali: Peace from Below?, Africa Briefing N°115,
14 December 2015 (only available in French).
Burkina Faso: Transition, Act II, Africa Briefing
N°116, 7 January 2016 (only available in
French).
Implementing Peace and Security Architecture
(III): West Africa, Africa Report N°234, 14 April
2016 (also available in French).
Boko Haram on the Back Foot?, Africa Briefing
N°120, 4 May 2016 (also available in French).
Nigeria: The Challenge of Military Reform, Africa
Report N°237, 6 June 2016.
Central Mali: An Uprising in the Making?, Africa
Report N°238, 6 July 2016 (also available in
French).
Burkina Faso: Preserving the Religious Balance,
Africa Report N°240, 6 September 2016 (also
available in French).
Nigeria: Women and the Boko Haram Insurgency,
Africa Report N°242, 5 December 2016
(also available in French).
Watchmen of Lake Chad: Vigilante Groups
Fighting Boko Haram, Africa Report N°244, 23
February 2017.
Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Counterinsurgency,
Africa Report N°245, 27 February
2017 (also available in French).
The Politics of Islam in Mali: Separating Myth
from Reality, Africa Report N°249, 18 July
2017 (only available in French).
Double-edged Sword: Vigilantes in African
Counter-insurgencies, Africa Report N°251,
7 September 2017 (also available in French).
Herders against Farmers: Nigeria’s Expanding
Deadly Conflict, Africa Report N°252, 19 September
2017.
The Social Roots of Jihadist Violence in Burkina
Faso’s North, Africa Report N°254, 12 October
2017 (also available in French).
Finding the Right Role for the G5 Sahel Joint
Force, Africa Report N°258, 12 December
2017 (also available in French).
Preventing Boko Haram Abductions of Schoolchildren
in Nigeria, Africa Briefing N°137, 12
April 2017.
Somalia and the Gulf Crisis
Crisis Group Africa Report N°260, 5 June 2018 Page 27
Appendix D: International Crisis Group Board of Trustees
CO-CHAIR
Lord (Mark) Malloch-Brown
Former UN Deputy Secretary-General
and Administrator of the United
Nations Development Programme
(UNDP)
PRESIDENT & CEO
Robert Malley
Former White House Coordinator
for the Middle East, North Africa and
the Gulf region
VICE-CHAIR
Ayo Obe
Chair of the Board of the Gorée
Institute (Senegal); Legal Practitioner
(Nigeria)
OTHER TRUSTEES
Fola Adeola
Founder and Chairman, FATE
Foundation
Celso Amorim
Former Minister of External Relations
of Brazil; Former Defence Minister
Hushang Ansary
Chairman, Parman Capital Group LLC;
Former Iranian Ambassador to the
U.S. and Minister of Finance and
Economic Affairs
Nahum Barnea
Political Columnist, Israel
Kim Beazley
Former Deputy Prime Minister of
Australia and Ambassador to the U.S.;
Former Defence Minister
Carl Bildt
Former Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister of Sweden
Emma Bonino
Former Foreign Minister of Italy and
European Commissioner for
Humanitarian Aid
Cheryl Carolus
Former South African High
Commissioner to the UK and
Secretary General of the African
National Congress (ANC)
Maria Livanos Cattaui
Former Secretary General of the
International Chamber of Commerce
Wesley Clark
Former NATO Supreme Allied
Commander
Sheila Coronel
Toni Stabile Professor of Practice in
Investigative Journalism; Director,
Toni Stabile Center for Investigative
Journalism, Columbia University
Frank Giustra
President & CEO, Fiore Group
Mo Ibrahim
Founder and Chair, Mo Ibrahim
Foundation; Founder, Celtel
International
Wolfgang Ischinger
Chairman, Munich Security
Conference; Former German Deputy
Foreign Minister and Ambassador to
the UK and U.S.
Yoriko Kawaguchi
Former Foreign Minister of Japan;
former Environment Minister
Wadah Khanfar
Co-Founder, Al Sharq Forum; former
Director General, Al Jazeera Network
Wim Kok
Former Prime Minister of the
Netherlands
Andrey Kortunov
Director General of the Russian
International Affairs Council
Ivan Krastev
Chairman of the Centre for Liberal
Strategies (Sofia); Founding Board
Member of European Council on
Foreign Relations
Ricardo Lagos
Former President of Chile
Joanne Leedom-Ackerman
Former International Secretary of
PEN International; Novelist and
journalist, U.S.
Helge Lund
Former Chief Executive BG Group
(UK) and Statoil (Norway)
Shivshankar Menon
Former Foreign Secretary of India;
former National Security Advisor
Naz Modirzadeh
Director of the Harvard Law School
Program on International Law and
Armed Conflict
Saad Mohseni
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
of MOBY Group
Marty Natalegawa
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Indonesia, Permanent Representative
to the UN, and Ambassador to the UK
Roza Otunbayeva
Former President of the Kyrgyz
Republic; Founder of the International
Public Foundation “Roza Otunbayeva
Initiative”
Thomas R. Pickering
Former U.S. Under Secretary of State
and Ambassador to the UN, Russia,
India, Israel, Jordan, El Salvador and
Nigeria
Olympia Snowe
Former U.S. Senator and Member of
the House of Representatives
Javier Solana
President, ESADE Center for
Global Economy and Geopolitics;
Distinguished Fellow, The Brookings
Institution
Alexander Soros
Deputy Chair of the Global Board,
Open Society Foundations
George Soros
Founder, Open Society Foundations
and Chair, Soros Fund Management
Pär Stenbäck
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and
of Education, Finland; Chairman of the
European Cultural Parliament
Jonas Gahr Støre
Leader of the Labour Party and Labour
Party Parliamentary Group; former
Foreign Minister of Norway
Lawrence H. Summers
Former Director of the U.S. National
Economic Council and Secretary of
the U.S. Treasury; President Emeritus
of Harvard University
Helle Thorning-Schmidt
CEO of Save the Children International;
former Prime Minister of Denmark
Wang Jisi
Member, Foreign Policy Advisory
Committee of the Chinese Foreign
Ministry; President, Institute of
International and Strategic Studies,
Peking University
Somalia and the Gulf Crisis
Crisis Group Africa Report N°260, 5 June 2018 Page 28
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL
A distinguished group of individual and corporate donors providing essential support and expertise to Crisis Group.
CORPORATE
BP
Shearman & Sterling LLP
Statoil (U.K.) Ltd.
White & Case LLP
INDIVIDUAL
(5) Anonymous
Scott Bessent
David Brown & Erika Franke
Herman De Bode
Stephen Robert
Luděk Sekyra
Alexander Soros
Ian R. Taylor
INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL
Individual and corporate supporters who play a key role in Crisis Group’s efforts to prevent deadly conflict.
CORPORATE
Anonymous
APCO Worldwide Inc.
Atlas Copco AB
Chevron
Edelman UK
Eni
HSBC Holdings Plc
MetLife
Noble Energy
RBC Capital Markets
Shell
INDIVIDUAL
(3) Anonymous
Mark Bergman
Stanley Bergman & Edward
Bergman
David & Katherine Bradley
Eric Christiansen
Sam Englebardt
The Edelman Family Foundation
Seth & Jane Ginns
Ronald Glickman
David Harding
Geoffrey R. Hoguet &
Ana Luisa Ponti
Geoffrey Hsu
David Jannetti
Faisel Khan
Cleopatra Kitti
Michael & Jackie Lambert
Samantha Lasry
Leslie Lishon
Malcolm Hewitt Wiener
Foundation
The New York Community Trust –
Lise Strickler & Mark Gallogly
Charitable Fund
The Nommontu Foundation
Brian Paes-Braga
Kerry Propper
Duco Sickinghe
Nina K. Solarz
Clayton E. Swisher
Enzo Viscusi
AMBASSADOR COUNCIL
Rising stars from diverse fields who contribute their talents and expertise to support Crisis Group’s mission.
Amy Benziger
Tripp Callan
Kivanc Cubukcu
Matthew Devlin
Victoria Ergolavou
Noa Gafni
Christina Bache
Lynda Hammes
Jason Hesse
Dalí ten Hove
Lindsay Iversen
Azim Jamal
Arohi Jain
Christopher Louney
Matthew Magenheim
Madison Malloch-Brown
Megan McGill
Hamesh Mehta
Tara Opalinski
Perfecto Sanchez
Nidhi Sinha
Chloe Squires
Leeanne Su
Bobbi Thomason
AJ Twombly
Dillon Twombly
Annie Verderosa
Zachary Watling
Grant Webster
SENIOR ADVISERS
Former Board Members who maintain an association with Crisis Group, and whose advice and support are called
on (to the extent consistent with any other office they may be holding at the time).
Martti Ahtisaari
Chairman Emeritus
George Mitchell
Chairman Emeritus
Gareth Evans
President Emeritus
Kenneth Adelman
Adnan Abu-Odeh
HRH Prince Turki al-Faisal
Óscar Arias
Ersin Arıoğlu
Richard Armitage
Diego Arria
Zainab Bangura
Shlomo Ben-Ami
Christoph Bertram
Alan Blinken
Lakhdar Brahimi
Kim Campbell
Jorge Castañeda
Naresh Chandra
Eugene Chien
Joaquim Alberto Chissano
Victor Chu
Mong Joon Chung
Pat Cox
Gianfranco Dell’Alba
Jacques Delors
Alain Destexhe
Mou-Shih Ding
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen
Gernot Erler
Marika Fahlén
Stanley Fischer
Carla Hills
Swanee Hunt
Aleksander Kwasniewski
Todung Mulya Lubis
Allan J. MacEachen
Graça Machel
Jessica T. Mathews
Barbara McDougall
Matthew McHugh
Miklós Németh
Christine Ockrent
Timothy Ong
Olara Otunnu
Lord (Christopher) Patten
Victor Pinchuk
Surin Pitsuwan
Fidel V. Ramos